Blood and Oil Essay

How to explain the post-Cold War violence? Some attribute it to indistinguishability politics (xi-xii). PaceSamuel Huntington, the cause is a struggle for resources (xii). Oil as special resource 2001 and since revelatory of the consequences of cover dependency (xiii-xv). Goal of intelligence Tracing the evolution of U.S. crude inunct colour insurance and weighing its consequences for the future (xvi). Ch. 1 The Dependency Dilemma Imported Oil and content Security. Cento (1-4). Military sees it as an extension of the 1980 Carter belief (5-6).Similar maturation elsewhere of armament as world(a) oil-protection service (6-7). Oil asked to U.S. economic and military strength (7-10). Oil makes this countrified strong dependency makes us weak (11). U.S. constitution has been to securitize oil (12).Dependency on merchandise oil surpassed 50%in April 1998 (13). Late 1990s policy debate (14). George W. Bush acknowledges problem but does not really answer dependency with policies (15). Dependency is not a static condition. (15) Forecasts of development dependency through 2025 (17-18). Table of proven reserves (19). Reserves in volatile regions (18, 20-21). U.S. presence in these regions and the nature of the oil industry ar inherently destabilizing (21-22).Competition (or demand) for oil is increasing (22-23).Result global economic derangement (23).Ineffectiveness of military strategy, which has serious unintended consequences (24-26). Ch. 2 Lethal Embrace The American Alliance with Saudi-Arabian-Arabian Arabia. Importance of U.S.-Saudi relationship (26-27). Anxiety about oil supplies in early 1940s led to decision in estimation of substantial and orderly expansion of production in Eastern hemisphere sources of supply, principally the Middle East (April 1944, Foreign rock oil Policy of the coupled States) (28-30). SOCAL creates CASOC and finds oil, 1938 (31).Recognition of importance leads Roosevelt to extend Lend-Lease to Saudi Arabia, 1943(32-33). U. S. govt. tries to set up the Petroleum Reserves Corp. to buy CASOCsconcession, 1943 but resistance keeps it from being realized (34-35). A public-private partnership (David Painter, Oil and the American Century1986) characterizesU.S. Involvement in development of Persian disconnect oil (35). Roosevelt and In Saud forge alliance, Feb. 14, 1945 (35-37). U.S.commitment to defend Saudi oil fields and the Saudi government and other Persian disjunction oil sources a major theme of cold- state of war history (37-38). Iran crisis of 1946 and concern for Mideast oil need to overcome domestic resistance to overseas commitments led to apocalyptical terms of the Truman Doctrine (39-41). U.S. helps create modern Saudi army and blood force, 1949-early 1950s (40). Eisenhower Doctrine (Jan. 5, 1957) designed to bolster pro-American regimes in the stage setting of Nassers flirtation with the Soviet Union (41-42).Vietnam War forced proxy-based Nixon Doctrine (July 1969) Saudi Arabia and Iran ar proxies of choice (42-43). exactly it inspired domestic immunity and leads to Shahs overthrow in 1979 (44-45). Hostage drama and Soviet impingement of Afghanistan lead to Carter Doctrine (Jan. 23, 1980) the U.S. will protect Persian Gulf oil by any means necessary (45-46).Creation of Central didactics (46-47). Consequences of the Carter Doctrine huge arms sales to Saudi Arabia (47-48), tilting toward Iraq in Iran-Iraq war (48-49), ousting Iraq from Kuwait (49-50). Aug. 6, 1990 Cheney-King Fahd meeting leads to Operation Desert Shield (51-52).Desert beleaguer (52-53). Containment of Iraq No-fly zones, $40b in arms to Saudi Arabia (53). 9/11 attacks and Osama bin pixilateds hostility provoked primarily by the deployment of American military man in Saudi Arabia and the continuing alliance among Washington and the Saudi royal family, which was a product of Americas appetency for imported oil and the monarchys hunger for protection (54-55). Ch. 3 Choosing Dependency The goo se egg Strategy of the Bush Administration. Bush administrations May17, 2001National Energy Policy(The Cheney report) (Feigns commitment to energy independence (56-59). But Ch. 8reveals immensity of growing dependency on imported oil in a chart and calls on the president to make our energy shelter apriority in our trade and foreign policy (61-64). Hopes for source diversification (LatinAmerica, Caspian Basin, and westerly Africa) face high risk of supply disruptions and shutdowns (64-66).Defense Planning focussingof 1992 and the Project for a New American Century highlight military (67-69).George W. Bushs Sept. 24, 1999 Citadel speech called for greater provide-projection capabilities (69-70). A Feb. 3, 2001 secrets instrument aims at assessing military implications of the energy plan (70-71). These 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes precedent projection (71-72). Warn terror morphing into energy supplyprotection It appears that theadministration has merged its thre e mainforeign-policy and warranter policies(increased access to overseas oil, enhancedpower-projection capabilities, and intensifiedanti-terror operations) into a single, unified plan (72-73). Ch. 4 pin down in the Gulf TheIrresistible Lure of Bountiful Petroleum. The Cheney report committed the UnitedStates to utter(a) dependence on PersianGulf oil (74-78). U.S. strategy aims atraising Persian Gulf oil production from 24.0million barrels per day in 1999 to 44.5 millionbarrels in 2020 (79).Obstacles economic,technological, political, and military (79-82).Strands of U.S. policy constitute a strategyof level best extraction (82-84). Primaryimportance of Saudi Arabia led both(prenominal) toadvocate in 2002 for seizure of Saudi oilfields (84-86). Social, economic, political,and religious sources of Saudi instability (86-89). U.S. come along is to strengthen Saudiroyal family and encourage recover (89-90).Iraq war as a panache of being able to withdrawU.S. troops from Saudi Arabi a (90).Palestinian statehood also backed for thisreason (91). Likewise. calls for reform andfighting terrorism in Saudi Arabia (91-93).Overthrow of Saddam Hussein needed bothto encourage Gulf stability and to boost Iraqiproduction (94-105). Irans policies are inopposition to U.S. plans in the Persian Gulf,and sanctions are an inadequate weaponbecause they impede development of petroleum resources (105-07). Iran also hasthe power to disrupt energy supplies byblocking the Strait of Hormuz (107-08).Forthe time being the dual-track policy of Zalmay Khalilzad, consisting of denouncingIrans government while encouragingopponents of the regime is being followed,but more aggressive policies are beingconsidered (108-10). Gulf problems willcontinue to require U.S. troops No matterhow costly the effort grows, we cannotremove our forces from the Gulf as long aswe remain committed to a strategy of maximum petroleum extraction. To meetanticipated U.S. energy demand in the yearsahead while also sl aking the thirst of otheroil-importing nations, the Gulf producersmust . . . boost their combined oil output by85 percent between now and 2020, andthese supplies must safely reach theirmarkets (111-12). Ch. 5 No arctic Havens Oil and Conflictbeyond the Persian Gulf.